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University of Massachusetts. Amherst 

One often hears talk that contemporary philosophy, in the most 
general sense, is broadly divided into two rather adversarial camps­
that of the "analytic" tradition and that of the "Continental" tradition. 
The former termusually refers to those philosophers concerned with 
logical analysis andconceptual clarity, philosophers whohave inher­
ited many of the concerns of the Vienna Circle and who continue to 
try and formulate a successful post-positivist epistemology. TIle 
latter term usually refers to the more speculative, metanarrative­
oriented philosophers such as Heidegger and Foucault, who seek to 
radically historicize all humaninquiry, particularly Western science 
and the various attempts by many philosophers to secure some form 
of first-order privilege for such scientific activity. 
In recent years, much has been written not only about the split 
between analytic and Continental philosophy, but also about closely 
related issues such as "modernism versus postmodernism," "objec­
tivism versus relativism" and Richard Rorty's schema of 
"foundationalism" versus "antifoundationalism,"l but for readers 
unfamiliar with the complexities of all these competing schools of 
philosophy, and also with the nuances that existinside the logics and 
doctrines of each of the major individual thinkers, grouping such a 
diverse array of figures and theories under a simple "analytic/ 
Continental" or "objectivist/relativist" dichotomy can often be more 
of a disservice than an elucidation. 
As undergraduates becoming initiated into the rich and detailed 
history of, for example, epistemology, we are bound at some point to 
oversimplify matters. For instance, with regard to how some may 
interpret Rorty's wholesale attack upon the epistemological tradi­
tion, one undergraduate philosophy instructor has remarked: 
LeBoeuf is a s8nior philosophy Imd economics double major altelldil1g the Ulliversity of 
Massachusetts at Amherst. A resident afThree Rivers, Massachusetts, lie plans ta pursue 
a doctorate in phiIosopTlY. 
I See, for instance, Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Hollis und 
Lukes; Margolis; and Putnam, Reason, Truth and History. 
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Teaching Rorty is difficult. Students respond favor­
ably, but superficially, to his critique. They consider 
it iconoclastic and exciting, but few of themhave had 
the time to feel the grip ofwhat he rejects. They may 
appreciate in an abstract way that it is unproductive 
to do epistemology but few canfeelliberatedby Rorty' s 
critique because they have not been captives of 
Bernstein's "Cartesian Anxiety" (Prado: d. 
Malachowski, pp. 365-6). 
Depending onwhatever vague and underdeveloped theoretical 
orientation we uphold, we may be hasty to stereotype others' theo­
ries as "Platonist" or "relativist," or wemayholda set ofbeliefs which 
inhlndsight are blatantly inconsistent. It is mybelief that much of the 
precociousness of our formative undergraduate years can be attrib­
uted to our misreadings of (and natural inability to yet adequately 
digest) various metanarrative "histories of philosophy"-i.e., those 
works which attempt to situate 2000 years of philosophy into a 
simple andneat framework. From Nietzsche' s Genealogy ofMorals to 
Reichenbach's The Rise ofScientific Philosophy, such texts, when read 
by individuals without adequate training in philosophy, are bound 
to receive ratherperverse interpretations. And it is not just first-year 
philosophy undergraduates who are guilty of such interpretations. 
Ifit is, infact, the case that many philosophyundergraduates engage 
incertain types of simplisms at early stages, thenfor obvious reasons, 
the same can be said for individuals in other academic disciplines 
who "dabble inphilosophy." 2 For instance, the influence of Derrida 
in English departments and Kuhn in history departments is quite 
significant. My point is not whether some philosophy undergradu­
ates are wishy-washy, but rather that we, who have noticed signifi­
cant changes in our ownphilosophical perspectives, use the lessons 
we have learned about ourselves to stem similar misinterpretations 
by others, especially as certain philosophical doctrines with poten­
tially radical consequences gain in popularity amongst individuals 
outside of p,rofessional philosophy.3 
The eclectic and controversial "pragmatism" ofRorty stands as a 
2 See, for instance, Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism; Hollis and 
Lukes; Margolis; and Putnam, Reaso1t, Truth and History. 
3 I have in mind here underdeveloped interpretations of thinkers such us 
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prime example of a metanarrative-oriented philosophy capable of 
easy misrepresentation. Cited as anauthoritative philosophical source 
by numerous individuals in the humanities and social sciences (but 
also scathingly attacked bya multitude throughout academia), Rorty 
is arguably the most talked about philosopher in the western world. 4 
Since the publication of his landmark book, Philosophy and the Mirror 
of Nature, the language of Rorty's subsequent essays has become 
increasingly accessible. Rorty's lucid writing style, with his injec­
tions of humor and his continual abandonment of technical analytic 
terminology, make him increasingly readable, while his ambitious 
attempts to synthesize a wide range of writers, both teclmical and 
literary, give his call for the end of philosophy a certain authoritative 
and rhetorical, if not seductive appeal to many non-philosophers. 
It has been noted by Alan Hobbs that: 
The Mirror of Nature is designed as an exorcism of 
ghosts. For students to profit from the book, their 
minds must therefore first be haunted. Without suit­
ably muscled ghosts with which to do battle, the 
excitement of the exorcism is missing (I-Iobbs: d. 
Malachowski, p. 366). 
Without "suitably muscled ghosts," the excitement may be missing 
but a real danger is quite present-namely, a grossly underdevel­
oped (or just plain wrong) interpretation of Rorty and all the unfore­
seen consequences that go with it. By briefly examining the core of 
Rorty's philosophy and by reflecting upon a few of the prevailing 
criticisms of his work, I hope to demonstrate (however indirectly) the 
potential that Rorty' s mass appeal may have in inadvertent! y fueling 
naive versions of relativism and irrationalism. This concern is com­
pounded tremendously, of course, ifRorty's philosophical pOSition 
canbe shown to be ultimately incoherent and unworkable, as many 
Nietzsche, FOLlC<lult, Heidegger, Denid<l, Kuhn, Rorty and various nea-Marxists. 
Though I focus in this paper on the philosophy of Richard Rorty, the S<lme rule of 
thumb would <lpply equally well to, for example, Chomsky or cert"in sociobiolo­
gists. 
4 For <l free-market economist' S total embrace of Ror ty'S philosophical position, 
see McCloskey; for <l similar embrace of Rorty's philosophy by two neo-Marxist 
economists, see Resnick and Wolff; for an English professor's complete dismiss" I of 
Rorty's view of language, see Steinmann. 
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of today's most prominent philosophers maintain. 
I 
What turned so manyheadswith the 1979 publication of Philoso­
phy and the Mirror a/Nature was the pronouncement, by a very able 
philosopher not only trained in the rigors of contemporary analytic 
philosophybut also conversant with the major Continental thlnkers 
of the day, that philosophy itself, as it has been traditionally con­
ceivedof,hadrunits course. As is well known, this is not the first time 
that someone had proclaimed the end of philosophy, but what is 
striking abou t Rorty is his status of being an "insider" to the technical 
arguments of cutting-edge analytic philosophy who is also sympa­
thetic to some of the most controversial ideas that have emerged 
from the Continental tradition inphilosophy. Rorty does not, how­
ever, see himself as "taking sides" in either the analytic / Continental 
or objectivist/ relativist split. He is equally critical of thinkers onboth 
sides of the Atlantic who subscribe to what he sees as an outmoded 
philosophicalenterprise-thatof "epistemological foundationalism." 
Rorty applies a grid of"foundationalism versus antifoundaticn­
alism" to 2000 years of Western philosophy, and he uses this grid to 
divide the history 0 f philosophy into those who believe that genuine 
foundations to knowledge can, in principle, be discovered or expli­
cated, and those who believe that all knowledge (including attempts 
to legitima te "genuine" know ledge) is his torically contingent. Under 
Rorty's schemata, foundationalism has been, and continues to be, all 
the various systematic attempts "to underwrite or debunk claims to 
knowledge made by science, morality, art or religion" (PMN, p. 3). 
Foundationalist philosophers belieye that by correctly spelling out 
the nature of the humanmind and its relationship to what is outside 
themind, we canhave knowledge of reality as itexists inand of itself. 
Rorty characterizes foundationalist philosophers' main conviction: 
To know is to represent accurately what is outside the 
mind; so to understand the possibility and nature of 
knowledge is to understand the way in which the 
mind is able to construct such representations. 
Philosophy's central concern is to be a general theory 
of representation, a theory which will divide culture 
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up into the areas which represent reality well, those 
which represent it less well and those which do not 
represent it at all (despite their pretense of doing so) 
(PMN,p.3). 
Such conviction is, according to Rorty, the central tenet that unifies 
all foundationalist philosophers-be they analytic or Continental. 
One can turn to nearly any page (if not any paragraph) of a Rorty 
article and hear the same leitmotif, though perhaps played in differ­
ent keys: epistemology-centered philosophy goes back to the Pla­
tonic urge to find universals, and though no one still believes in 
Platonic ideas, we have nonetheless inherited the idea that true 
knowledge can be ascertained-that, in one form or another, lan­
guage or the mind acts as a "mirror of nature." Universality, neces­
sity, rationality, correspondence theory, representationalism, objec­
tivism, cOgnitivism, essentialism, logocentricism, structuralism, re­
alism-all these terms (as well as others) are, ifwe are to follow Rorty, 
members of the same family, as they all presuppose the feasibility of 
the epistemological project. 
Wittgenstein, Heideggel' and Dewey are the figures whom Rorty 
regards as "the three most important philosophers of our century" 
(PMN, p. 7), fOl' each was, in his early years, a foundationaHst­
trying to ground knowledge systematically-but in time, 
[e]ach of the three came to see his earlier effort as se 1f­
deceptive, as an attempt to retain a certain conception 
of philosophy after the notions needed to flush out 
that conception (the 17th-century notions of knowl­
edge andmind) has been discarded ... , Thus their later 
work is therapeutic rather than constructive, edifying 
rather than systematic, designed to make the reader 
question his own motives for philosophizing rather 
than to supply him with a new philosophical pro­
gram (PMN, pp. 5-6). 
II 
In an early favorable review of Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror 
of Nature, Richard Bernstein notes that some readers of Rorty who 
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"may not be acquainted with the latest subtleties" of issues and 
arguments in analytic philosophy 
mayhave felt that somehowphilosophy tookawrong 
tumwith the analytic movement.Theymay feel some 
satisfaction that Rorty haswritten the type ofcritique 
thatcould onlybewrittenbyan"insider," and that he 
has shown that the emperor has no clothes-or at 
least is scantily clad. If only Anglo-American phi­
losophershad takena different turn ... then we might 
have avoided the tangled mess whichhas consumed 
so much technical competence. But if this is the way 
theyhave readRorty, then theyhavemisread himand 
they have missed the real sting of his critique (PCM, 
pp.38-9). 
Rorty, after all, is formulating his ideas within the tradition of 
analytic philosophy-using the techniques and arguments of ana­
lytic philosophers to buttress his metanarrative hopes. (Whether his 
moves are valid is, of course, an entirely different issue). Rorty 
describes the antLfoundationalist "therapy" he is offering as "para­
sitic upon the COllstl'Uctive efforts of the very analytic philosophers 
whose frame of reference I am trying to put in question" (PMN, p. 7). 
I-Ience, most of ROfty'S particular criticisms of various attempts at 
foundationalism4 are, in a sense, borrowed from various analytic 
philosophers such as Quine and Davidson: 
I am as much indebted to these philosophers for the 
means I employ as I am to Wittgenstein, Heidegger 
andDewey for the ends towhich thesemeans are put. 
I hope to convince the reader that the dialectic within 
analytic philosophy ... needs to be carried a few steps 
further. These additional steps will, I think, put us in 
a position to criticize the notion of "analytic philoso­
phy" and indeed of "philosophy" itself as it has been 
understood since the time of Kant (PMN, pp. 7-8). 
'For Rorty. the foundationalist urge took its distinctively modern turn with 
Locke, Descartes and especially Kant. See "The World Well Lost." 
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The question we must ask ourselves is precisely how many 
"steps further" we have license to take withoutbecoming incoherent. 
Rorty's radical antifounda tionalism leaves absolutely no room what­
soever for even a trace of the idea that "the world," in some way and 
to some degree, "determines" our knowledge. According to Rorty, 
any such hope can onlybe Kant's "noumena" dressed up inmodem 
garb. "If you start out with Kant's epistemology," writes Rorty, "in 
short, you will wind up with Kant's transcendental metaphysics" 
[WWL, p. 16). Rorty sees Kant's attempt to find apriori principles and 
structures (that Kant believed were presupposed for genuine knowl­
edge-especially with regard to the success of science) as the imme­
diate forerunner of analytic philosophy and the general fmm of its 
traditional concern with epistemological foundations. Rorty is pre­
pared to classify today's sophisticated versions of scientific realism5 
as no more than latent Kantianism, pure and simple. Adopting an 
argument of Davidson's, Rorty writes: 
All that can be done with the claim that "only the 
world determines truth" is to point out the equivoca­
tion in the realists' own use of 'world.' In the sense in 
which" the w o rid" is just whatever tha t vast majority 
of our beliefs not currently in question are currently 
thought to be about, there is of course no argument ... 
The notion of "the world" as used in a phrase like 
"different conceptual schemes carve up the world 
differently" must be the notion of something com­
pletely unspecified and unspecifiable-the thing-in­
itself, in fact (WWL, p. 14). 
Hence, everything from the more explicit versions of scientific 
realism to Quine's "naturalized epistemology" (which reserves a 
special determinate role for stimuli-triggered "observation state­
ments") depends ultimately on what amounts to a Kantian defense. 
As with most philosophers he chanicterizes as "foundationalist," 
Rorty portrays Quine in a pejorative manner, arguing that 
5 For lending defenses of scientific realism, see for instance, the workofRichm:d 
Boyd, Larry Laudnn, Ernnn McMullin nnd Clnrk Glymour. Rarty's most direct 
address to these and other renUsts is his essay, "Is Natural Science a Natural Kind?" 
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other philosophers followed Quine in falling back 
into dogmatic metaphysicS, decreeing that the vo­
cabulary of the physical sciences "limns the true and 
ultimate structure of reality." It is significant that 
Quineconc1uded that "theunit of empirical inquiry is 
the whole ofscience," whenonemight have expected, 
given the drift of his argument, "the whole of cul­
ture." Quine, andmany other holists, persisted in the 
belief that the science-nonscience distinction some­
how cuts culture at a philosophically significant joint 
(NS, pp. 46-7). 
One canstill, however, subscribe to a holism that does regard "the 
unit of empirical inquiry" as "the whole of culture" and yet not be 
forced to accept Rorty's conclusions. One such holism is that of 
Davidson,6 who notes his point of departure from Rorty: 
Wherewe differ, ifwedo, is onwhether there remains 
a questionhow, given thatwe cannot "get outside our 
beliefs and our language so as to find some test other 
than coherence", we nevertheless can have knowl­
edge of, and talk about, an objective public world 
which is not of our ownmaking. I think this question 
does remain, while I suspect that Rorty doesn't think 
so (Davidson, p. 123), 
Hilary Putnam's "internal realism," which he backs up with the 
notion of a transcendental rationality. is another holistic line we can 
take that is very different from Rorty's. As a causal theory of 
reference, it is one of the last foreseeable defenses of the very notion 
of "reference" (that there is some determinate linkage between "our 
world" and "the worId"). Putnam counts Rorty as a "cultural relativ­
6 Davidson's philosophy resls heavily on Quine' 5 theoryof meaning. IfQui ne' s 
indeterminacy of translation thesis ultimately has no empirical explann tory power 
(since different translation manuals, or different "conceptual frameworks," all 
squarewith the stimuli of "the world") then Davidson's argument against "the very 
idea of a conceptual scheme" has even less empirical explanatory power, and 
consequently (and in a rather paradoxical way) seems to square ever more so with 
common-sense realism (ala Tarski). One then wonders how Rorty feels he has the 
license to deny (or at least qualify in a very strange way) the primary roles of 
"reference" and "truth" and the concept of reason they presuppose (PFD). 
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ist" because of Rorty's insistence that convincing one's peers is all 
there is to the game of "truth." In the Peircean tradition, Putnam 
writes: 
What I am saying is that the "standards" accepted by 
a culture or a subculture, either explicitly or implic­
itly, cannot define what reason is, even in context, 
because they presuppose reason (reasonableness) for 
their interpretation ..., Reason is ... both immanent 
(not to be found outside of concrete language games 
and institutions) and transcendent (a regulative idea 
that we use to criticize the conduct of all activities and 
institutions) (Putnam, p. 234). 
According to Rorty, using the term "reason" (with its implicit 
notionofanidealconvergencepointof"truth")isreallynomorethan 
convincing others to accept your assertions-there is no role being 
played by "the world," as the term is really just a confusion with 
language. Putnam, however, stresses that we cannot appeal to a 
consensus definition of reason "because consensus among grown­
ups presupposes reason rather than defining it (Putnam, p. 240). 
Reason, as Putnam describes it, is normative. ASCribing to it a 
transcendentalnalurecan be viewed as a Kantianmove,butsowhat? 
One will only see this as something "bad" if one subscribes to 
Rortyism, which (given the ideals, scientific achievements and 
"foundationalist" accounts of the Enlightenment) certainly must 
bear the burden of proof. 
III 
This brings us to the issue of whether Rotty is a relativist. But first 
we must be eleen' about what we mean by the term "relativist." 
In its most ancient form, relativism is Protagoreanism, the self­
contl'adidory view that accompanies a s ta tement such as, "there is no 
truth." How are we to judge sucha statement? For if it were true that 
"there is no truth," we would have a reflexive paradox-as there 
wouldbe at least one true statement, namely, that "there is no truth."7 
7 For a nice introduction to the self-referential problem and discussion of how 
it affects the philosophies of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida. see Lawson. 
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Responding to anticipated charges that he subscribes to this type of 
naive relativism, Rorty writes: 
"Relativism" is the view that every belief on a certain 
topic or perhaps about any topic. is as good as every 
other. No one holds this view. Except for the occa­
sional cooperative freshman, one cannot find any­
body who says that two incompatible opinions on an 
important topic are equally good .... If there were any 
relativists, they would, of course, be easy to refute. 
One would merely use some variant of the self­
referential arguments Socrates used against 
Protagoras. But such neat little dialectical strategies 
only work against lightly-sketched fictional charac­
ters. The relativist who says that we can break ties 
among serious and incompatible candidates for be­
lief only by "nonrational" or "noncognitive" consid­
erations is just one of the Platonist or Kantian 
philosopher's imaginary playmates, inhabiting the 
same realm of fantasy as the solipsist, the skeptic and 
the moral nihilist (PRI, pp. 166-7). 
But ifnaive Protagorean relativism8 is an "imaginary playmate" for 
"Platonist or Kantian philosophers," cannot we turn the tables on 
Rorty. arguing that "naive Platonism" (as Rorty often seems to 
caricature most of Western philosophy) is Rorty's own imaginary 
playmate? Charles Taylor writes of the 
certain suppositions [that] seem to be made in the 
various invocations of [Rorty' s] argument: that the 
only candidate for a general account of truth is in 
terms of cor respondence; that correspondence is to be 
understood ina rather simpleminded way. approach­
ing at times a picture theory; that believers in the 
correspondence theory are Raving Platonists. Under­
lying all of this is a continuing imprisonment in the 
8 Joseph Margolis warns us that, "relativism should not be construed as, or as 
reducible to, any form of skepticism, cynicism, nihilism, irrationalism, anarchism or 
the like, although it may be that a well-defended relativism would lend comfort to 
doctrines of these sorts" (67). 
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model basic to the whole epistemological tradition 
which understands thinking in terms of representa­
tion.... By Raving Platonism, I mean the view that 
Rorty often invokes to ridicule his adversaries, such 
as that "the final vocabulary of a future physics will 
somehow be Nature's Own," or "that a vocabulary is 
somehow already out there in the world." We should 
consider this just as a rhetorical flourish. Rorty can't 
really believe that hard-faced scientific realists who 
think that mechanistic materialism is literally true, 
subscribe to Raving Platonism (Taylor, pp. 268-9). 
In a similar vein, Richard Bernstein (whose criticisms of Rorty 
have become harsher and more pointed over the years) writes: 
Why does Rorty think that philosophy (or "Philoso­
phy") amounts to little more than the worn-out vo­
cabulary of "bad" foundational discourse? So much 
of his recent writing falls into the genre of the "God 
that failed" discourse. There seems to be something 
almost oedipal-a form of patricide-in Rorty's ob­
sessive attacks on the father figures of philosophy 
and metaphysics (OSF, p. 557). 
It certainly does seem that Rorty paints far too much of a human face 
on the West's apparent predisposition to engage in epistemological 
foundationalism. Rorty is an intellectual historian and, as such, he is 
prone to "lay the blame" of our foundationalist urges (if not explic­
itly, then implicitly) on Kant, and before him, Descartes, going all the 
way back to Plato.9 
Rorty's d1aracterization ofhow we arrived at our present modes 
of scientific and philosophicalinquiry appears much more black and 
white than Peirce's "cable versus chain" account of knowledge, 
where instead of picturing our reasoning as a linear and isomorphic 
"chain" from, say, "facts" to "states-of-affairs-in-the-world," we 
instead picture our fallible knowledge, at any given moment, as the 
many different types of evidence, modes of argumenta tion, hunches, 
9 Cornel West believes tha t Rorty' s "thin historicism rests can ten t with intellec­
tual historical narratives and distrusts social historical narratives ... his narrative 
needs a more subtle historical and sociological perspective" (West, p. 270). 
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etc., that, individually, are only weak strands, but. collectively. form 
a strong cable. We never have know ledge that perfectly corresponds 
to "the world," but "the world" does guide, in a certain determinate 
sense, where our inquiry moves. Of Rorty's caricature of Western 
philosophy as being simply a series of illusory "chain" pictures, 
Bemstein echoes Taylor: 
According to this story. the real villain is Plato-at 
least the Plato identified (mythologized) byPlatonism 
... Iwant to maintain that this narrative is itself rapidly 
becoming a blinding prejudice that obscures more 
than it illuminates. What was once a stinging critique 
is becoming a bland, boring cliche. One begins to 
wonderifthereeverwasa"foundationalist"thinker­
at least one who fits the description of what Rorty 
calls "foundationalism." Even Plato-the Plato of the 
Dialogues-fails to fit this description ... Rorty's char­
acterization and caricature of the history of philoso­
phy is rapidlyrunnmg itself into the ground ... what is 
now needed is to demythologize this narrative of the 
invidious fallelmess of Platonism. For it is only to the 
extent that we still accept some version of Rorty's 
mythologizingaboutw hat philosophy and metaphys­
ics are, and what "philosophic justification" must be 
that his playful skepticism has any sting .... It is time 
that Rorty himself should appropriate the lesson of 
Peirce, "Do notblock the road to inquiry ..." (OSF, Fp. 
558-60). 
Bernstein, like Rorty, believes it is time to go "beyond objectivism 
and relativism," that for too long we have been suffering from 
"Cartesian Anxiety"-Le., the fear that unless we emerge from our 
Cartesian skepticism with some kind of secure and objective 
Archimedean point for our knowledge, we will be in a state of 
epistemological nihilism, having no objective reasons for the beliefs 
we hold to be true and perhaps not even knowing what to believe. 
Bemstein sees traditional epistemology as offering us a false di­
chotomy. a false "Either lOr," to choose from-in which we eithel' 
believe in objective and stable bedrock foundations for our knowl­
edge, or else everything is relative. But Bernstein sees in Rorty yet 
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another grand and equally untenable EitherJOr-that of 
foundationalism versus antifoundationalism. 
It is, after all, only a grid, only one of the many possible ways to 
quickly summarize 2000 years of human inquiry. As ametanarrative, 
it is hard to see how Rorty's philosophy can escape rela tivism and, 
ultimately, a forced position of irrationalism. And, as Steinmann 
notes, "the intellectual price of accepting it is far too high, and, worst, 
it is incoherent ... Why should we renounce the Enlightenment and 
its (still quick) heirs for unspecified benefits" (Steinmann, p. 47)? 
Despite the controversies, counterarguments and uncertainties 
that surround Rortyism, he seems to be gaining in popularity, 
particularly with disciplines outside of professional philosophy and 
with the lay public. Any philosophy student who, at one time or 
another, found himor herself uncritically swallowing (hook, line and 
sinker) a doctrine such as Rorty's (and I count myself as one) must 
take it upon him or herself to engage others in exercises that will 
sufficiently muscle their ghosts and haunt their minds. 
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